Top 5 questions to ask yourself before you drive yourself to Pearl
Harbor
- Have I ever been there?
- Do I really know why we were attacked?
- While I figure out how to navigate the sites how much will I
miss?
- What do I do when the parking lot is full?
- What will keep my kids busy for 5 hours?
If you can't answer these questions confidently, then you would
probably be
better off with a tour and a guide who makes your experience smoother.
Select your Pearl Harbor Tour Now
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WHY WAS PEARL HARBOR ATTACKED?
The Japanese dreamed of an Empire in Asia and began their quest
in early 1931. They overran Manchuria and established it into a
state which they named Manchukuo. Moving into China, the Japanese
were initially successful, but ultimately encountered the resistance
of the Chinese, under the government Chiang Kai-shek. A crisis arose
in 1937, when Japan launched a major offensive in an effort to
reduce China into submission.
When this tactic was unsuccessful, Japan adopted a policy of
economic strangulation. By 1939, major costal ports had been seized
and the Chinese capital had been forced to move from Nanking inland
to Hankow.
In 1940 the French allowed the entry of Japanese troops into
Indochina. A treaty was concluded with Thailand (Siam) and by the
end of 1940 and the Japanese were threatening the Burma Road which
was China’s last supply line from the outside world. By July 194l
they had completed their occupation of French Indochina and began to
turn their sights to Thailand, Burma and the Philippines.
Concerned over Japan’s ambitions, the US, Netherlands and Great
Britain froze Japanese assets in their countries and imposed
stringent economic restrictions, cutting off 90% of raw materials
required by Japan for war production. The US demanded the aggressive
actions against China and Indonesia be halted. Japan was forced to
choose between abandoning her efforts or seizure of other areas rich
in raw materials. Abandonment was unthinkable and Japan chose the
latter.
By December, 194l the Japanese Army had a force of 2,400,000 trained
ground troops and an air fleet of 7,500 planes. The US had a force
of 1,500,00 of which 1,000,000 were not completely trained, 1157
combat aircraft and 347 war ships. However, America had already
committed to a large portion of war production in the European
Conflict.
Japan moved forward with war plans. They believed the US Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor was their only threat and set out to
neutralize the fleet by means of a surprise air attack.
COMMANDERS OF THE US PACIFIC FLEET
The US was under the Command of Lt. General Walter Short who was
in charge of Army defenses in Hawaii when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
Short’s military career began during World War I and lasted almost
40 years. Shortly after the attack on December 17, 1941, Short was
relieved of his duty by Lt. Gen. Delos Emmons and he requested and
was granted retirement.
Admiral Husband Kimmel who served as Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Fleet, also had a short lived career after the Pearl Harbor
attack. Kimmel who also had a lengthy military career beginning in
1915. He served during World War I. He was also relieved of his duty
on December 17, 1941. and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz took command of
the Pacific Fleet. Kimmel requested and was granted retirement.
Both Short and Kimmel underwent scrutiny for their actions during
the four years that followed through hearings and investigations
before Congress. For years each tried to clear their names. It was
not until 2000 that Congress issued a resolution saying that the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not a result of their
“dereliction of duty” and found that both had acted in a competently
and professional manner.
Admirals Kimmel and Lt. General Short shared the same belief: they
did not expect an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. Short
regarded his major mission as training. Both Short and Kimmel failed
to heed any warnings and seldom got together to coordinate efforts
between the Army and the Navy.
Both Short and Kimmel underwent scrutiny for their actions during
the four years that followed through hearings and investigations
before Congress. For years each tried to clear their names. It was
not until 2000 that Congress issued a resolution saying that the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not a result of their
“dereliction of duty” and found that both had acted in a competently
and professional manner.
WHY WAS THE US UNPREPARED?
The first warning Hawaii received that Japan might resort to
military action against the US was sent by the Navy to its fleet
commanders on October 16, 1941. The Army staff in Washington
disagreed with the Navy's warning and the War Department sent a
supplementary message to commanders advising they did not see an
abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy in the near future. The War
Department did not believe that Japan was on the verge of attacking
the United States. Under the circumstances commanders of the Pacific
Fleet saw no need to do any more than what was already being done.
There was also an assumption in Washington that Japan had no sea
borne aircraft capable of catching the Army’s B-24 bombers. They
further believed that Japan had over extended their military in
other regions and could not concentrate a military forces for a
large scale strategic offensive in the Pacific. On the eve of the
attack, the Honolulu press reflected the belief of Washington that
Japan was too weak to pose a really serious threat to the United
States.
There was a complete lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy
and no one in authority believed in the dangers to which Pearl
Harbor was exposed. Training activities preoccupied the Commanders
to the exclusion of adequate preparedness against attack and as they
prepared for war, they saw no need for Hawaii to be ready for a
large-scale attack.
On December 7, 1941, Washington intercepted a written message from
Japan threatening war. The United States did not appreciate the full
implications of the 7:30 am Hawaii deadline. A last minute warning
was sent to the Pacific commanders, however General Short did not
receive the message until hours after the attack. Poor
communications between Washington and Hawaii helped the Japanese
achieve the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
As two early warnings of the approaching Japanese attack came,
however, both were ignored. At approximately 6:30 a.m., a Japanese
midget sub was spotted and sunk near the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
Shortly thereafter, an Army radar station on Oahu's north shore
reported the sighting of planes about 50 miles away to the Watch
Commander at Army information center at Fort Shafter. It was then
reported to a Navy lieutenant. The Navy lieutenant believed they
were US planes returning from a reconnaissance flight or B-17’s
scheduled to arrive from California and the sighting was ignored.
TWO WAVES
The Japanese began their air attack which came in two waves. The
first wave arrived over Pearl Harbor at approximately 7:45 a.m. to
find seven U.S. battleships moored along "Battleship Row", on the
east side of Ford Island. Another battleship was in dry dock in the
nearby Navy Yard. Other moorings which the Japanese believed might
include battleships, or the equally important aircraft carriers,
were at the Navy Yard's 1010 Dock and along Ford Island's western
side.
The Japanese initially hit the airfields, including destroying many
aircraft located on the southern tip of Ford Island. This attack
followed by the dispatch of communications was the World's first
notification that war had begun in the Pacific.
Moments thereafter, torpedo planes attacked from west hitting the
USS Helena, USS Utah and USS Raleigh, all on the west side of Ford
Island. From the east torpedo planes came in and hit the USS
California, the USS Nevada, USS Oklahoma and West Virginia located
on the east side of Ford Island.
As the torpedo planes continued the first wave attack, additional
bombs were dropped on "Battleship Row", hitting several ships. The
USS Arizona received a death blow followed by a huge explosion. As
the first wave departed, the Japanese telegraph operator taped out
Tora, Tora, Tora: the code word for surprise attack achieved.
The second wave of planes further attacked some of the ships already
hit, further destroying the Navy Yard. The battleship Pennsylvania
and three destroyers were bombed in dry dock. Other bombers went
after the Nevada, which had left her berth and was trying to get to
sea. Anti-aircraft gunfire met these aircraft, causing losses which
were far greater than those of the first attack wave.
Fortunately, neither wave had the opportunity to hit American
aircraft carriers, all of which were out at sea. Fuel Storage tanks,
maintenance areas and most destroyers and submarines were not
targeted. However, in less than two hours the Japanese had ruined
the U.S. Pacific Fleet's battleship force, ensuring the US would not
interfere with further plans for conquest. |
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